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Financial Factors in the Great 
Depression 
Charles W. Calomiris 
eginning with Irving Fisher (1933) and John Maynard Keynes (1931 
B [1963]), macroeconomists have argued that financial markets were 
important sources and propagators of decline during the Great De- 
pression. Turning points during the Depression often coincided with or were 
preceded by dramatic events in financial markets: stock market collapse, waves 
of bankruptcy and bank failure, and contractions in the money stock. But the 
mechanism through which financial factors contributed to the Depression has 
been a source of controversy, as has been the relative importance of financial 
factors in explaining the origins and persistence of the Depression. 
This essay reviews the literature on the role of financial factors in the 
Depression, and draws some lessons that have more general relevance for the 
study of the Depression and for macroeconomics. I argue that much of the 
recent progress that has been made in understanding some of the most 
important and puzzling aspects of financial-real links in the Depression fol- 
lowed a paradigm shift in economics. A central, neglected theoretical piece of 
the story for financial factors was the allocative effects of imperfections in capital 
markets, which can imply links between disruptions in financial markets and 
subsequent economic activity. Also, the increasing emphasis on learning and 
"path-dependence" in economics has helped to explain why financial shocks 
during the 1930s were so severe and why policy-makers failed to prevent the 
Depression. 
* Charles W. Calomiris is Associate Professor of Finance, University of Illinois, 
Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, and Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
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The Monetarist Revolution and the Great Depression 
In their monumental Monetary History of the United States (1963), Milton 
Friedman and Anna Schwartz provided a simple and potentially powerful 
explanation of the origins of the Great Depression that depended on exoge- 
nous changes in the money supply. Just as importantly, they clearly defined 
crucial elements of the sequence of events from 1929 to 1940 that any theory of 
the Depression would have to explain, especially the co-movements of nominal 
GNP and the money stock, the movements of prices, and changes in the relative 
size of various components of the money stock. 
Friedman and Schwartz were less interested in explaining the beginnings 
of the recession of 1929 and the October stock market crash than in the 
question of how an initial downturn in 1929 became transformed into the Great 
Depression. They argued that waves of banking crises, beginning in October 
1930 and ending in March 1933, substantially reduced the money multiplier 
and the money stock. The failure of the Federal Reserve to offset this decline 
with open market operations and loans to banks through the discount window 
led to a drastic contraction in economic activity. They argued this policy failure 
resulted from a change in leadership within the Fed (notably, the departure of 
Benjamin Strong). Monetary ease and recovery from 1933-1936 was followed 
in 1937 by contractionary monetary policy and economic decline, which 
Friedman and Schwartz traced to the doubling of the required reserve ratio in 
an ill-conceived attempt to reduce excess reserves in the banking system.' 
Since its publication, Friedman and Schwartz's Monetary History has de- 
fined much of the research agenda for the study of connections between 
financial markets and real activity during the Depression. Subsequent research 
continues to address five broad categories of questions raised directly or 
indirectly by Friedman and Schwartz's work: 
1) To what extent are the reductions in the money supply from 1930 to 
1933, and the waves of bank failure that Friedman and Schwartz focused on to 
explain them, properly viewed as exogenous to the decline in income, and 
to what extent were they merely symptoms of a decline that had separate 
origins? 
2) In light of the near-zero nominal short-term interest rates of the 1930s, 
was it possible to argue that the demand for money was stable, and that a 
decline in money supply would lead to a fall in nominal income? Or was there 
an elastic demand for money at low interest rates (that is, a Keynesian liquidity 
trap)? 
IThe attempt to reduce excess reserves resulted from the mistaken belief that excess reserves were 
an unnecessary surplus and a potential threat to monetary control. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) 
argued that high excess reserves reflected increased liquidity preference by banks in the face of the 
crisis in the financial system. 
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3) Were Fed actions and the failure of policy during the "Great Contrac- 
tion" of the money stock the result of new policy and new leadership, as 
Friedman and Schwartz contended, or did they represent the application of the 
same old formulas to new circumstances? 
4) Could a monetarist explanation, or any explanation relying on nominal 
price and wage rigidity, account for the persistent stagnation of the economy 
during the 1930s? 
5) Could Federal Reserve open market operations alone, unaccompanied 
by changes in monetary and regulatory regimes (like the departure from the 
gold standard, direct government intervention to assist banks, or the suspen- 
sion of convertibility requirements for deposits), have reversed economic de- 
cline at any time during 1930-1933, as Friedman and Schwartz claimed? 
For two decades after the publication of Monetary History, the literature on 
the Great Depression focused on the first three of these questions. Roughly 
speaking, economists agreed that the sticky-price, IS-LM paradigm was the 
proper framework within which to capture the links between financial and real 
markets, although they disagreed on some details, like which interest rate to 
focus on as a measure of monetary stringency in 1930-1933, and on how to 
think of the adjustment process toward market clearing in the goods, bond, 
and money markets. A few dissidents saw the neoclassical synthesis as in- 
herently incapable of capturing real-financial links (Gurley and Shaw, 1960; 
Goldsmith, 1969; McKinnon, 1973; and Minsky, 1975 are noteworthy), but 
only Kindleberger (1973) focused on the Depression. His insistence on complex 
financial linkages and feedback across countries, without supplying formal 
modeling or measurement of these mechanisms, was welcomed with the enthu- 
siasm accorded Banquo at Macbeth's feast. 
Because Friedman and Schwartz, and their supporters and critics, initially 
framed their debate more or less within the standard IS-LM model, financial 
shocks were viewed through the narrow windows of changes in the money 
stock, or stock-market price effects on wealth, and hence, consumption de- 
mand. The consensus achieved by this literature initially was limited. 
Progress was made on the narrow question of whether monetary shocks 
could have been an important source of disturbance during the 1930s. Various 
researchers found that money demand was stable during the 1930s (that there 
was no liquidity trap), and hence, that money-supply shocks could have had 
important effects on output (Meltzer, 1963; Gandolfi, 1974; Gandolfi and 
Lothian, 1977). 
Nevertheless, others questioned the exogeneity of money-supply changes 
or their importance during the banking crises, and noted that the real stock of 
money had not contracted during the early stages of the Depression (as shown 
in Figure 1) as should have occurred, in the context of an IS-LM model, if 
money supply had been the dominant source of disturbance (Temin, 1976; 
Gordon and Wilcox, 1981). Critics advocated additional "autonomous- 
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Sources: Bank deposits are from Friedman and Schwartz (1970, pp. 507-13, columns 3 + 6); the 
wholesale price index and industrial production index are from U.S. Department of Commerce 
(1949, pp. 344, 310) 
expenditure" shocks to explain the origins of the Depression (Hickman, 1973; 
Temin, 1976; Gordon and Wilcox, 1981). Meltzer (1976) argued that interna- 
tional monetary forces, driven by misalignment of prices across countries, may 
have caused early price and output reductions through the price-specie-flow 
mechanism.2 
These early debates about the sources of disturbances continue and much 
remains unsettled (Bordo, 1986). Conclusions about the relative importance of 
monetary and autonomous-expenditure shocks have turned out to be quite 
sensitive to empirical methodology and different researchers' interpretations of 
observed time-series relationships. Large, autonomous consumption reductions 
in 1929-1930, posited by Temin (1976), have been confirmed by Hall (1986) 
and Romer (1990), but questioned by Gordon and Wilcox (1981), Gordon and 
Veitch (1986), and others. Gordon and Wilcox (1981) find that the association 
between lagged money and current income is weak for the 1930s, while the 
association between contemporaneous movements is stronger, which they ar- 
gue is more consistent with endogeneity of money. Monetarists respond that 
the relationship between money and GNP is subject to lags of variable and 
2According to Hume's price-specie-flow mechanism, international price disequilibrium brings forth 
endogenous changes in international flows of goods, and offsetting flows of specie, which realign 
price levels across countries. 
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uncertain length, and cite evidence that banking crises in the 1930s are 
associated with changes in the money multiplier (for example Anderson and 
Butkiewitz, 1980; Boughton and Wicker, 1979; Schwartz, 1981; Trescott, 1984). 
As Wicker (1989) points out, however, the association between bank failures 
and money-multiplier changes need not imply exogenous change in the money 
supply, since both may have followed income and interest rate changes. In- 
deed, the most likely exogenous source of change in the money stock on a priori 
grounds, the first banking crisis of 1930, may have been primarily of local 
importance and seems to have had little effect on national economic activity 
(Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, p. 313; Wicker, 1980, 1982), although it did 
mark a change in the risk premium for low-grade corporate securities (Ham- 
ilton, 1987). In a similar vein, White (1984) argues that the first banking crisis 
of 1930 was not an exceptional event, or a turning point for the banking 
system, but rather represented a continuation of patterns of bank failure 
during recession experienced in earlier years. 
Recently, some convincing evidence has emerged of exogenous distur- 
bances in the market for money balances during the Depression. Ironically, the 
clearest evidence produced on the importance of exogenous changes in the 
money supply pertains to the pre-October 1929 period (which had always been 
viewed by monetarists and non-monetarists alike as a period of tight monetary 
policy), and to subsequent influences on the money supply more moderate 
than the sharp contractions of the money stock during the banking crises 
emphasized by Friedman and Schwartz. Field (1984a, 1984b) showed that 
securities market trading increased the demand for money in the late 1920s, 
and that this increase in demand was not offset by expansion in supply. Indeed, 
the expansion in demand worked in concert with the contraction in money 
supply in 1929 to increase interest rates and reduce prices and economic 
activity. Wheelock (1990) found that a subsequent downward shift in banks' 
demand for borrowed reserves caused a reduction in the money multiplier 
which the Fed did not offset with open market operations. This produced a 
persistent reduction in the money supply during the Depression. While of 
interest, these studies provided little direct support for the central and truly 
novel point of Friedman and Schwartz's thesis-that waves of severe exogenous 
monetary contraction beginning in late 1930 converted the relatively normal 
recession of 1929-1930 into the Great Depression collapse of 1930-1933. 
The criticisms of Friedman and Schwartz deprived monetary shocks of 
their status as primary, indisputable forces in the Depression. The Friedman- 
Schwartz view, while coherent as an explanation of the fall in income from 1930 
to 1933, lacked empirical evidence that could not be explained by other 
reasonable interpretations of the data. Even staunch advocates of monetarism 
(like Meltzer, 1981) retreated to compromise positions in light of the new 
evidence, and focused instead on the counterfactual point-that stable money 
demand implied that the Fed could have prevented the Great Depression, if 
policy had been wiser. 
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Even this weak form of the Friedman-Schwartz argument-that the Fed 
should have done a better job conducting monetary policy, if only in reaction to 
other exogenous events-was undergoing challenge by economic historians. 
Friedman and Schwartz had argued that, had he lived, Benjamin Strong would 
have done a much better job managing policy than his successors. Judging by 
the standard of past Fed policy, they argued that the policies of 1929-1933 
represented a movement backward in competence. This was an important 
argument for Friedman and Schwartz. If Federal Reserve policy had been 
ineffectual or counterproductive throughout the interwar period, then one 
could not reasonably argue that effective monetary policy was part of the 
available "technology" at the time of the Depression. This issue is central to the 
question of whether the Depression was avoidable at the time. 
Elmus Wicker (1965) was the first to raise objections to Friedman and 
Schwartz's view of changes in Federal Reserve targeting in the 1930s, and his 
views were buttressed by Brunner and Meltzer (1968). In essence, these and 
other critics argued that the Federal Reserve did not change policy regime in 
the 1930s, that policy was often unwise or ineffective, and that the Fed's 
behavior prior to 1933 was constrained by poor targets and indicators (stock 
prices, borrowed reserves, gold flows, and interest rates), poor understanding 
of the economy, and by an adherence to the gold standard and a consequent 
emphasis on international as well as domestic objectives. As part of maintaining 
the gold standard, central banks must respond eventually to persistent outflows 
of gold with contractionary open market operations, to drive up interest rates, 
attract gold, and preserve gold reserves. Thus the Fed's pursuit of domestic 
objectives was limited by its commitment to maintain a credible long-run link to 
gold, and by its view of what policy responses that entailed. Furthermore, open 
market operations had little overall effect on the supply of high-powered 
money because they often were offset by changes in member bank borrowings 
(Toma, 1989). Wheelock (1989a, 1989b, 1992) provided supporting descriptive 
and econometric evidence for the stability of the Federal Reserve's reaction 
function over the interwar period, which caused the Fed to misread credit 
conditions in early 1931, and to fail to expand the money supply in late 1931, 
even after it became aware of tight credit-market conditions. Consistent with its 
long-standing policies, in early 1931, the Fed interpreted high excess reserves 
and low interest rates-which were the result of a massive worldwide flight to 
liquidity by individuals and banks-as signs of easy money, which warranted 
higher interest rates to preserve external balance. After Britain left gold in 
September 1931, outflows of reserves from the United States prompted tighten- 
ing of monetary policy to preserve external balance. 
This reaction function had been derived from previous experience and by 
the prevailing doctrines of central bank policy under the gold standard (Temin, 
1989). This policy may have been appropriate in some circumstances, but it 
increased the fragility of the financial system and contributed to the decline of 
money, credit, economic activity and prices in 1931. One can lament poor 
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policy by the Fed in the 1930s, and it is true that some criticized Fed policies at 
the time (thus wise advice was available, in principle), but one cannot expect 
the Fed to have learned the lessons of the Great Depression before it happened. 
A Change in Paradigm, New Questions, and Old Answers 
For two decades after Monetary History, the literature on the Great Depres- 
sion argued cause and effect essentially within the confines of the neoclassical 
synthesis that reigned in macroeconomics in the 1960s and 1970s. In this 
context, financial factors are identified primarily with money-supply shocks and 
stock market influences, which in turn affect investment and consumption 
demand through interest elasticities, wealth effects, and changing perceptions 
of uncertainty (Temin, 1976; Gordon and Veitch, 1986; Romer, 1990). 
But a transformation in thinking about the role of financial markets in the 
economy was under way. Economists began to formulate theoretical arguments 
of why conditions in financial markets might not be accurately captured by the 
aggregate value of capital in the stock market, the supply of money, and "the" 
real or nominal interest rate. Theoretical models of credit allocation under 
asymmetric information imply that access to external finance may be inhibited 
because of information costs faced by sources of outside funding. Under these 
circumstances, "insiders"-firm managers and financial intermediaries with an 
ongoing relationship with the firm-can supply funds at lower cost than 
"outsiders" -relatively uninformed stockholders and bondholders. An impor- 
tant implication of this literature is that changes in the allocation of wealth in 
the economy can increase the cost of outside finance if they reduce the available 
supply of "insider" funding. For example, decreases in the wealth of insider 
shareholders, or reductions in bank net worth that inhibit bank lending 
capacity, will increase firms' reliance on outside funds and drive up the cost of 
those funds. Furthermore, the demands for assets and the pricing of assets will 
reflect the extent to which assets are "liquid"-that is, the extent to which their 
value is a matter of common knowledge. Early contributions to this literature 
included Akerlof (1970), Jaffee and Russell (1976), Leland and Pyle (1977), 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Myers and Majluf (1984). 
Mishkin (1978) was the first to apply the new literature on imperfect 
capital markets to the Great Depression. Mishkin (1976) presents a model of 
consumer "distress" to analyze the role of debt deflation in reducing consumer 
durables demand. He argues that consumers valued "liquidity" (that is, holding 
wealth in assets that do not suffer distress-sale discounts due to asymmetric 
information about their true value). Exogenous shocks to consumer liquidity 
will lead consumers to reduce their demand for illiquid consumer durables as 
they try to rebuild their stock of liquid assets. This framework served as the 
basis for Mishkin's (1978) study of the effects of changes in the household 
balance sheet and consumer expenditures during the Depression. According to 
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Mishkin (1976), the changing distribution of wealth, not just aggregate wealth, 
should matter for aggregate consumption. Mishkin (1978) argued that in 
addition to the depressive effect of aggregate wealth reduction on consumption 
in the 1930s, the debt deflation (a reallocation of wealth away from indebted 
consumers) reduced aggregate consumption demand. 
Mishkin's research, with its emphasis on the depressive effects of excess 
leverage and the allocative consequences of wealth redistribution in the pres- 
ence of capital market imperfections, marked an important change in the 
direction of the literature on financial factors in the Depression. However, his 
contribution still remained within the confines of the neoclassical synthesis, as 
part of the explanation for the early autonomous contraction in consumption 
demand. Bernanke's (1983) study of the consequences of financial disruption 
during the Depression took Mishkin's arguments a step further. Bernanke 
argued that in the presence of capital market imperfections, the destruction of 
intermediaries and the reduction in borrowers' net worth-both the results of 
debt deflation-reduced investment in the 1930s by increasing the marginal 
cost of funding. Reductions in firm net worth increase credit costs for firms 
because as debt deflation erodes the equity stake of firm "insiders," the ratio of 
external to internal claims on the firm rises. Under asymmetric information this 
increases the marginal cost of external finance. Debt deflation also erodes the 
net worth of banks, causing some banks to fail, and others to tighten their 
credit standards to avoid runs by depositors. Thus access to "inside" debt from 
relatively well-informed banks is also curtailed. The financial devastation of 
1929 to 1933 had always been given prominence in accounts of the Depression. 
Bernanke's (1983) contribution was to combine theory and empirical evidence 
to argue that financial collapse was more than a symptom of economic decline; 
financial collapse deepened the Depression by hampering the efficient alloca- 
tion of capital. 
In retrospect, given the dramatic changes that occurred in financial mar- 
kets from 1929 to 1933, it may seem surprising that it took so long to develop 
such an argument. During this period the ratio of high-to-low rated bond debt 
fell from 2.4 to 0.3 (Hickman, 1960, p. 21). Defaults on bonds from 1930 to 
1939 were nearly triple the number that had occurred from 1920 to 1929 
(Hickman, p. 249), and the market value of defaulted issues (for 1930-1943) at 
their default dates averaged 34 percent of par, compared to 61 percent for the 
period 1920-1929 (Hickman, p. 560). As shown in Figure 2, the quality spread 
in bond market yields jumped dramatically during the Depression, and real 
liabilities of failed businesses tripled. Nominal liabilities of failed businesses rose 
from a monthly average of $40 million for January 1928 through December 
1929 to a monthly average of $63 million for January 1930 through June 1933 
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1949, p. 349). 
Moreover, bank failures rose to historically unprecedented heights, with 
historically unprecedented costs to depositors. The banking collapse of the 
1930s differed in kind and degree from earlier banking crises. During the 
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Figure 2 
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Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943, pp. 469-71) 
national banking era, nationwide bank suspensions of convertibility by banks 
occurred at, or just following, cyclical peaks. These suspensions were short-lived 
and produced few bank failures (Calomiris and Gorton, 1991). In the 1930s, 
widespread suspensions came late in the cycle, in 1931 and 1933, after banks 
had suffered devastating losses due to borrower bankruptcies and deflation. 
Destabilizing deflation was fueled by persistent withdrawals of deposits and 
contraction in the money supply, which could have been prevented by an early 
nationwide suspension of convertibility. Unlike those of earlier periods, bank 
suspensions during the Depression were not brief and resulted in unprece- 
dented numbers of failed banks. The period from 1921 to 1929, which itself 
saw an unusual rate of loss for banks due to the agricultural depression of the 
1920s, paled by comparison to the much shorter period from 1930 through 
1933. For 1921-1929, the deposits of failed banks totaled $1.6 billion, with 
estimated losses to depositors of $565 million. For 1930-1933, the deposits of 
failed banks totaled $6.8 billion, with estimated losses to depositors of $1.3 
billion (Board of Governors, 1943, p. 283).3 Surviving banks substantially 
curtailed their lending, with loan-to-deposit ratios falling from 0.85 in 1929 to a 
low of 0.58 in January 1933. 
3Nearly half of the liabilities of suspended banks for the period 1930-1933 is attributable to 
suspensions that coincided with the bank holiday of 1933 (Bernanke, 1983, p. 262). 
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Bernanke's research was informed by new models of capital market failure, 
but these were not the main motivation for his approach to modeling connec- 
tions between financial collapse and real decline in the 1930s. The search for a 
new paradigm of financial-real interaction followed from an incompleteness in 
the earlier literature on the Depression, which Bernanke focused on in his 
introduction (p. 257): 
One problem is that there is no theory of monetary effects [per se] on the 
real economy that can explain protracted nonneutrality. Another is that the 
reductions of the money supply in this period seems quantitatively insuf- 
ficient to explain the subsequent falls in output. 
According to Bernanke, the decline in the efficiency of the economy's 
financial allocation mechanism induced by the reduction of banks' lending 
capabilities and the collapse of producers' and consumers' net worth should be 
thought of as long-lived shocks to financial technology, and therefore, can 
explain the persistent decline in output through a rise in the "cost of credit 
intermediation." Indeed, if shocks to credit costs mainly constrained the growth 
of newer, technologically innovative, "information-intensive" firms with rela- 
tively less access to credit facilities in the 1930s, the long-term consequences for 
economic activity might have been especially pronounced (Hunter, 1982; 
Calomiris and Hubbard, 1991). 
Another weakness in the IS-LM approach to modeling real financial links 
during the Depression was its dependence on price stickiness. Explanations of 
economic decline during the Depression that rely on reductions in real money 
balances, autonomous changes in expenditure, or a price-specie-flow mecha- 
nism all assume price rigidity or price disequilibrium. But as Figure 1 shows, 
wholesale prices and bank deposits show close contemporaneous co-movements 
even at high frequencies, which argues against the assumption of protracted 
price adjustment, at least for wholesale prices.4 
Bernanke cited (and likely was motivated by) the writings of several 1930s 
chroniclers of credit market conditions and economists who emphasized persis- 
tent disruption to financial markets as one of the main continuing problems of 
the Depression after 1933, and who viewed deflation as a destabilizing influ- 
ence.5 The economists on this list include Irving Fisher (1933), whose classic 
4It is also interesting to recall that Gordon and Wilcox (1981) found the strongest association 
between money and economic activity was essentially contemporaneous. Calomiris and Hubbard 
(1989) found similar results for financial-real association during the pre-World War I period and 
argued that strong contemporary association made more sense in the context of a credit squeeze (in 
which flows of goods may be abruptly discontinued) than in a standard monetary disequilibrium 
story, which should involve a protracted process of portfolio and price adjustment. 
5Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) argue that chroniclers and economists before Friedman and 
Schwartz generally used the phrase "money market" to mean the market for short-term credit, and 
that pre-Federal Reserve real-financial links were properly seen by contemporaries as the result of 
shocks to credit supply (partly involving unanticipated deflation). 
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statement of the debt-deflation cycle mirrors many of Bernanke's arguments. 
Perhaps the most prominent advocate of this position in the 1930s was Keynes 
(1931 [1963], pp. 175-76) who wrote: 
... there is scarcely any class of property, except real estate, however 
useful and important to the welfare of the community, the current money 
value of which has not suffered an enormous decline. This has happened 
in a community which is so organised that a veil of money is, as I have 
said, interposed over a wide field between the actual asset and the wealth 
owner. The ostensible proprietor of the actual asset has financed it by 
borrowing money from the actual owner of wealth. Furthermore, it is 
largely through the banking system that all this has been arranged. That 
is to say, the banks have, for a consideration, interposed their guarantee. 
They stand between the real borrower and the real lender. They have 
given their guarantee to the real lender; and this guarantee is only good if 
the money value of the asset belonging to the real borrower is worth the 
money which has been advanced on it. It is for this reason that a decline 
in the money values so severe as that which we are now experiencing 
threatens the solidity of the whole financial structure. 
In his empirical work, Bernanke showed that both shocks to firms' and 
banks' net worth were significant (statistically and economically) for explaining 
the fall in output during the 1930s, even after taking account of monetary 
shocks. Indicators of declining net worth of banks and firms-including defla- 
tion, corporate failures, bank failures, and the bond risk spread-all were 
important as predictors of economic decline over and above monetary shocks. 
The new focus on deflation and financial disruption also had implica- 
tions for the way the Depression was transmitted across countries. Indeed, 
Kindleberger's (1973, pp. 144-45) analysis of international transmission had 
argued that stock market decline and deflationary shocks, which precipitated a 
liquidity squeeze, a contraction in bank lending, and international financial 
collapse beginning in 1930, turned the recession of 1929-1930 into the Great 
Depression: 
New lending stopped because of falling prices, and prices kept falling 
because of no new lending. As the less-developed countries lost access to 
loans and spent their gold and foreign-exchange reserves, they were 
forced to sell old quantities of primary products for what the market 
would bring. Deflation spiraled. 
In cross-country comparisons, Kindleberger (1973, pp. 232 ff) also empha- 
sized that countries remaining on gold after 1931 suffered from deepening 
depression, while those that abandoned gold began the process of recovery. By 
remaining on gold, countries tied their price levels to a declining world trend 
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as the demand for gold kept rising. Countries leaving gold were free to pursue 
independent monetary policy and bring an end to deflation. International 
comparisons linking maintenance of the gold standard, deflation, and continu- 
ing decline have been confirmed in more formal studies (Eichengreen and 
Sachs, 1985, 1986; Temin, 1989; Bernanke and James, 1991; Eichengreen, 
1 992).6 
The "new view" of Bernanke and others was not a rejection of Friedman 
and Schwartz's argument that monetary shocks were important. Its main 
contribution was to show that monetary shocks, and other disturbances during 
the early phase of the Depression, had long-run effects largely because they 
affected the institutional structure of credit markets and the balance sheets of 
borrowers. Indeed, Hamilton (1987) argued that the appropriate model of the 
origins and persistence of the Great Depression combines monetary shocks to 
explain the origins of the recession of 1929, and other shocks in 1930, with 
consequent unanticipated deflation from 1930 to 1933, which operated on the 
economy through Bernanke's transmission mechanism. Based on his analysis of 
futures market prices, he argued that deflation was unanticipated, and that 
increases in the bond risk spread coincided with the onset of financial disrup- 
tion in 1930. Hamilton (1987, 1992) does not resolve the question of whether 
autonomous consumption or money-supply shocks were more important in 
1930; he argues that substantial deflation followed these shocks, and that 
deflation had persisting influences. 
In retrospect, despite their focus on the money stock, Friedman and 
Schwartz drew attention to evidence favorable to the "new view." Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963, pp. 312-15) and Schwartz (1981, pp. 31-38) saw high 
yield spreads on bonds as indicating a general liquidity crisis which they 
associated with a fall in the money multiplier in late 1930. This emphasis on 
broader definitions of "liquidity" than the available money stock is consistent 
with the direction pursued by Bernanke, Hamilton, and Mishkin in their 
research. In particular, Mishkin (1991a, 1991b) argued that reductions in stock 
prices and increases in quality spreads in bond markets are best viewed as the 
result of changes in "lemons" discounts on securities prices under asymmetric 
information, which signal financial-market disruption and reductions in inter- 
nal funds available to firms.7 Financial market disruption has a larger impact 
6Despite these elements of agreement, there remain important differences among these authors 
regarding the desirability of a worldwide departure from gold. Kindleberger (1973, pp. 294ff) 
argues that the failure to support the gold standard early on through coordination of central bank 
policies (an international lender of last report) caused worldwide deflation, while Eichengreen 
(1992, pp. 301-302) takes exception to this view and claims that absent fundamental long-run 
changes in policy, maintenance of the gold standard was untenable. From Eichengreen's perspec- 
tive, the departure from gold was a necessary step to avoid the Depression, while Kindleberger 
views the collective abandonment of gold as a mistake. 
7Formal models with these implications abound (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 
1988; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, 1990; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990; Brock and LeBaron, 
1990; Gertler and Hubbard, 1991). 
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on certain firms, and thus reduces their creditworthiness and the value of their 
securities in the market. Mishkin (1991 a) analyzed yield spreads for bonds and 
stock price movements during historical financial panics and confirmed a 
"flight to quality" (that is, an increased penalty for firms whose prospects suffer 
an asymmetric-information discount). He applied this analysis to bond and 
stock markets in 1930, and argued for a similar "flight to quality" at the 
beginning of the recession of 1937. Mishkin's analysis of securities markets 
provides a theoretical explanation for time variation in the risk premium of 
stocks and bonds by linking these changes to exogenous disruptions in financial 
markets throughout U.S. history.8 
Implications of the "New View" 
The non-monetary propagation hypothesis has at least three interesting 
implications that distinguish it from the earlier monetarist position. 
First, the financial-propagation view of the Depression implies that a 
money-supply shock of a given magnitude will have a larger effect if it occurs at 
a time of high leverage, or in an economy with a poorly diversified, geographi- 
cally fragmented banking system like that of the United States. From this 
perspective, the "new-age" optimism of the 1920s (Dominguez, Fair, and 
Shapiro, 1988; Romer, 1990; Nelson, 1991) worsened the magnitude of the 
financial and real reactions of the 1930s in the face of deflationary shocks. That 
optimism had been reflected in stock price rises (White, 1990; Rappoport and 
White, 1991; De Long and Shleifer, 1991) and debt accumulation, notably in 
the new consumer debt market (Mishkin, 1978). The effect of the pre-existing 
debt burden on the balance sheets of consumers and producers may have been 
somewhat muted in the early years of the Depression by an expectation of an 
early recovery. However, the unprecedented debt burden, which continued to 
rise during the deflation of the early 1930s (as shown in Figure 3), reduced the 
creditworthiness of many borrowers through drastic redistributions of wealth. 
The extent to which the Depression's severity was a consequence of the 
financial boom that preceded it remains an interesting question for future 
research. 
Second, once the character of financial market influences is broadened to 
include non-monetary channels, earlier monetarist arguments that restoring 
the money supply to earlier levels through open market operations in 
1931-1933 could have reversed the course of the Depression and prevented 
bank failure, borrower insolvency, and economic decline must be qualified. 
Because the financial system is path-dependent, disturbances to the allocation 
of wealth and the viability of financial intermediaries caused by open market 
8Of course, one could argue that time-varying risk premia at times of financial crisis reflect other 
influences. Disentangling the relative contribution of asymmetric information and other cyclical 
influences on risk premia remains an important topic for future research. 
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Figure 3 
Real Debt and Stock Prices 
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operations cannot in general be reversed by open market operations that 
restore the money supply. Borrowers or bankers who have already suffered 
large losses due to increased debt burdens and costs of financial distress will not 
regain lost wealth as the result of subsequent open market operations. Their 
balance sheet positions have changed. Moreover, the effects of policy-induced 
deflation and inflation are asymmetric; that is, too much leverage is penalized 
by the capital market by more than too little leverage is rewarded, and costs of 
financial distress incurred in states of low net worth have no counterpart in 
states of high net worth.9 Thus, according to the new view, even if Friedman 
and Schwartz and their supporters were entirely correct about the importance 
of monetary shocks in precipitating the Depression, it does not follow that open 
market operations to restore the money supply would have had offsetting 
effects in promoting recovery from the Depression. 
Third, different methods of increasing the money supply-say, expansion- 
ary open market operations vs. reductions in the discount rate-might have 
had very different consequences for recovery (contrary to Friedman and 
Schwartz, 1986, p. 201). The discount window could have been used to provide 
9Furthermore, if expansionary open market operations to reverse a previous decline are antici- 
pated, they would have no effect on the allocation of wealth, and thus would not reverse the effects 
of previous unanticipated deflation. 
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focused assistance to the banking system and decrease the relative cost of bank 
credit, while the benefits of expansionary open market operations would have 
been confined to increases in the aggregate supply of money, increased prices, 
and reduced interest rates on riskless short-term securities. This argument 
certainly does not mean that subsidies to firms, deposit insurance, or bank 
bailouts are always a desirable alternative form of government intervention; 
however, one of the implications of the new financial view is that open market 
operations may be a blunt and insufficient instrument for reversing the effects 
of bad previous policy compared to other policies. This reasoning underlay the 
arguments of some financial analysts who advocated other policies, including 
direct government assistance to banks and firms through the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, to stimulate recovery from the Depression (Clark, 1933; 
Harris, 1933, p. 713). 
Was Deflation Unanticipated? 
Several recent papers have challenged or supported the new synthesis of 
early monetary (and other) shocks and long-run financial propagators for 
explaining the origins and persistence of the Depression. 
A central element of the new financial view is that deflationary shocks from 
1929 to 1933 were largely unanticipated (otherwise, they would not have 
produced financial distress), and this has been the topic of several papers.'0 In 
support of Hamilton's (1987) results, several papers argue that relatively 
sanguine expectations and forecasts of economic activity and prices persisted 
into 1929 and 1930 (Dominguez, Fair, and Shapiro, 1988; Romer, 1990; 
Nelson, 1991). Hamilton's (1992) subsequent work has reiterated his earlier 
findings using new methods for extracting price forecasts from futures prices. 
While there is some continuing disagreement between these authors and 
Cecchetti (1992) over precisely how much of the deflation was anticipated at 
short time horizons, all parties agree that there was substantial unanticipated 
deflation even at quarterly frequencies. Furthermore, Evans and Wachtel 
(1991) argue that over longer-term frequencies most of the deflation was 
unanticipated. They find that agents systematically overestimated the probabil- 
ity of a return to a zero-inflation regime rather than continuing deflation. 
Given that debt contracts often were written with durations greater than several 
months, the rise in the real value of long-term debt that occurred must have 
been unanticipated. Kuvin (1936, p. 36) estimates total long-term debt as 
roughly $84 billion in 1929 (at a time when national income was roughly $87 
billion, and short-term debt was roughly $150 billion, as estimated respectively 
't)Anticipated deflation still could have had a depressive effect on the economy, as argued by Temin 
(1989); but it would not have produced financial distress, since agents anticipating deflation would 
reduce interest costs to offset the capital loss from debt deflation. 
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by Kuznets, 1941, v. 1, p. 147, and Clark, 1933, p. 301). Hickman (1960, p. 60) 
reports that 98 percent of outstanding bonds in 1928 had maturities of greater 
than one year, and 78 percent had maturities of greater than 5 years. Mort- 
gages, which comprised half of both farm and nonfarm household indebtedness 
in 1929 (Goldsmith, 1962, v. 3, pp. 67, 75), typically had durations of three to 
five years (Snowden and Bu-Saba, 1992). 
New Challenges and Interpretations 
The new view's emphasis on deflation prompted several cross-country 
comparisons of the role and transmission of deflation. In notable recent work, 
Haubrich's (1990) study of financial-real interactions during the Depression 
applies empirical methods similar to Bernanke (1983) to Canada. He finds that 
measures of financial distress have no economic or statistical significance for 
predicting economic activity in Canada. Haubrich interprets this as evidence 
that without bank failures (which were absent in Canada's increasingly concen- 
trated nationwide branch-banking system), financial distress has little macro- 
economic consequence. However, there are at least four reasons to doubt the 
general proposition that macroeconomic financial distress depends on 
widespread bank failures, and the application of this proposition to the 1930s. 
First, Canada and the United States were not equally vulnerable to finan- 
cial disturbances at the time of the Depression. According to theoretical models 
of the allocative effects of wealth redistribution, the effects on economic activity 
of deflation-induced reductions in net worth are nonlinear and depend on the 
initial balance sheet position of the firm, and its initial composition of 
inside and outside funding (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, 1990; Calomiris and 
Hubbard, 1990). For example, a borrower with a low debt-to-asset ratio or a 
large preexisting amount of inside equity funding may remain highly credit- 
worthy even in the face of severe deflationary shocks. While the United States 
and Canada suffered similar deflations from 1929 to 1933, Canadian real debt 
burdens started lower and never reached levels comparable to the United 
States. In the United States from 1929 to 1933, debt service relative to GNP 
increased from 9 percent to 19.8 percent, while in Canada it rose from 3.9 
percent to 6.4 percent (Haubrich, 1990, p. 242). As noted earlier, the run-up in 
debt burdens during the 1920s in the United States set the stage for the 
deflation-induced increase in financial distress; in Canada, the run-up in the 
1920s was less pronounced, and thus one would expect the impact of financial 
shocks to have been weaker. 
Second, in Canada the money stock may have been a better indicator of the 
outstanding volume of short-term credit than in the United States where 
non-bank forms of credit (like commercial paper) were much more important. 
Thus in comparable regressions that include the money stock, one would 
expect changes in the Canadian money stock to capture changes in the cost of 
credit better than money stock changes in the United States, leaving more of a 
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"credit-cost" residual to be explained by non-monetary factors in the United 
States. Thus financial factors may have been important in Canada, but less 
likely to show up as significant in regressions that also include the money stock. 
Third, Canada's relative reliance on banks as sources of short-term credit, 
and the concentration of the banking industry, may have reduced the costs of 
managing financial distress in Canada relative to the United States. The 
concentration of lending and renegotiation authority may have reduced the 
impact of increased debt burden on economic activity. Recent studies have 
found that both the concentration of lending and the reliance on banks for 
loans mitigate declines in firms' securities prices and funding sources during 
financial distress (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1990a; Gilson, John, and 
Lang, 1990; Brown, James, and Mooradian, 1991). 
Fourth, Haubrich's interpretation of his findings implies that exogenous 
variation in "inside equity" has smaller allocative consequences than similar 
variation in the availability of "inside debt" (bank loans). It is difficult to justify 
this distinction between inside debt and inside equity as a theoretical proposi- 
tion. The central point of the asymmetric-information approach to corporate 
finance is that outside funds, whether debt or equity, entail greater costs than 
funds supplied by relatively informed stockholders/managers and their 
bankers. At times when cash flow is scarce, or when insiders' stakes are 
reduced, the cost of funds rises. Recent empirical findings in the literature on 
investment and corporate finance support this approach to firms' costs of funds 
(Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 
1990b; Mackie-Mason, 1990). Calomiris and Hubbard's (1991) study of Ameri- 
can manufacturing firms in the mid-1930s shows that accumulated retained 
earnings were a substantial constraint on corporate investment for roughly one 
quarter of firms. It follows that at least these firms would have substantially 
reduced their investment in response to a deflation-induced reduction in inside 
equity. 
For these reasons I do not think Haubrich's findings support his general 
conclusion (and his suggested interpretation of Bernanke, 1983) that bank 
failures are a necessary precondition for the transmission of financial distress. 
Rather, Haubrich's study suggests (subject to the caveat of my second qualifica- 
tion of his results) how different countries' financial institutions and initial 
conditions affect their relative vulnerability to financial disturbances. 
Temin (1989) challenges the importance of unanticipated deflation and 
Bernanke's financial transmission mechanism for the United States. Temin 
argues that the anticipated component of the deflation (post-1930) must have 
been more important, particularly downward rigidity of nominal interest rates 
(which keeps the cost of borrowing high), and the Mundell-Tobin portfolio- 
reallocation effect." Temin rejects the Bernanke-Hamilton view because, he 
IIThe Mundell-Tobin effect relies on portfolio allocation toward money when the inflation rate is 
low (Mundell, 1963; Tobin, 1965). For example, in Tobin's dynamic framework, expected deflation 
reduces the attractiveness of holding real capital and thus reduces equilibrium economic activity. 
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argues, one of its major predictions fails to hold: firms with relatively high costs 
of external finance (small firms) should have suffered the most from the 
increase in the cost of credit intermediation. Temin constructs a test of this 
proposition and rejects it. He divides the economy into industries and asks 
whether industries with low concentration ratios suffered unusually severe 
contractions relative to other industries compared to other cyclical downturns. 
Finding no such pattern, he rejects the importance of increases in the cost of 
credit as the propagator of deflation. 
I would raise three objections to Temin's test. First, differences across firms 
in costs of finance may not show up in industry-level aggregation. Second, 
concentration ratios at the industry level may be a very poor indicator of 
cross-industry variation in external finance costs. Firm size, which itself is only 
indirectly related to Temin's measure, is an imperfect indicator of finance costs, 
and Calomiris and Hubbard (1991) show that it is a very noisy indicator for the 
mid-1930s. Third, cross-sectional differences in industry performance may be 
hard to observe during a massive disturbance like the Depression that substan- 
tially affects all borrowers, particularly if there is feedback in demand across 
industries. 
Moreover, there is cross-sectional evidence, among firms rather than in- 
dustries, of relatively severe reactions to financial turmoil by firms with higher 
finance costs during the Depression, and evidence that a substantial number of 
firms faced very high costs of external finance by the mid-1930s. Kimmel (1939) 
found refusal or restriction of bank credit to manufacturing firms normally 
dependent on banks occurred for only 3.2 percent of the largest firms, but the 
refusal/restriction rate increased monotonically by size categories to a 30.2 
percent refusal/restriction rate for the very smallest firms. Following Temin's 
suggestion, one can compare these restriction/refusal rates to those in the 
recession of 1960. The Small Business Administration circulated a question- 
naire asking firms, among other things, whether they received as much long- 
term credit as they requested from lenders. None of the 15 firms with asset 
values greater than $5 million reported being constrained, while 14 percent of 
111 firms with lower asset values reported receiving less long-term credit than 
requested (Carson, 1963, p. 114). While these surveys may not be perfectly 
comparable, the results support Bernanke's view that the Depression was a 
time of unusual credit hardship for small firms, even compared to other 
recessions. 
In an interesting study that has received little attention, Hunter (1982) 
provides more detailed evidence along these lines. She groups firms by size 
categories and examines differences in firms' balance sheet changes during the 
Depression. She argues that corporate liquidity preference increased substan- 
tially during the Depression, but increases in liquidity were confined mainly to 
large firms. Large firms were the only ones capable of improving their liquidity 
positions because of their superior access to financial markets. Hunter also 
compares the relative liquidity positions of small firms to large firms during the 
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Depression with that of other periods and finds that the financial stringency of 
the Depression was associated with a uniquely large difference between the 
liquidity positions of large and small firms. This evidence provides more direct 
support for Bernanke's position using standards of comparison suggested by 
Temin (1989). 
Calomiris and Hubbard (1991) also provide evidence supporting the view 
that the mid-1930s were a time when many firms faced high costs of external 
finance. Using firm-level data on dividend responses to the undistributed 
profits tax in 1936 and 1937, corroborated by data on costs of securities issuing, 
they find substantial heterogeneity in the costs of finance across firms, and that 
a large number of firms (roughly a quarter of all firms paying taxes) had a 
shadow price differential between internally generated and externally obtained 
funds in excess of 20 percent. The investment of firms with high external 
finance costs was highly sensitive to internally generated funds, while other 
firms' investment was not. 
In summary, cross-sectional evidence confirms Bernanke's (1983) interpre- 
tation of time series patterns. The costs of external finance were quite high 
during the Depression, these costs were particularly high for small, growing 
enterprises. High finance costs reflected both the reduced creditworthiness of 
firms as well as a contraction in the availability of "inside" bank debt. 
Conclusion 
The study of financial factors during the Great Depression has seen much 
progress over the last 30 years. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) provided a 
strong foundation of facts and provocative interpretations on which subsequent 
research has built. This body of research also has shaped the way economists 
think about monetary policy and financial markets more generally. For exam- 
ple, many macroeconomists now believe that a large fraction of macroeconomic 
disturbances have long lives, that monetary policy operates largely through its 
effect of the real supply of bank credit, and that price flexibility can be 
disruptive if it takes the form of unanticipated deflation. Those views are 
compatible with, if not caused by, the last decade of research on financial 
factors during the Depression. 
In addition, some insights from the study of the Great Depression seem to 
have methodological significance for the study of macroeconomic fluctuations, 
not all of which has been absorbed by macroeconomics. 
First, the literature on financial factors emphasizes the importance of 
modeling the economy as an historical process. Prior experience governs the 
information available to private agents and policy-makers, the stubbornness of 
expectations, the balance sheets of agents, and the vulnerability of the economy 
to disturbances. The "deep parameters" of the economy (which depend on 
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agents' information) are always changing. The reaction of the economy to 
exogenous shocks depends on interactions between shocks and time-varying 
state variables. Much progress in understanding financial factors during the 
Depression over the past 30 years has come from a willingness to take a careful 
look at specific moments of time and place them in an historical context, rather 
than collapse history into a long time series of aggregate data. 
Second, recent research on financial factors in the Depression also has 
shown that panel and cross-section studies, which provide comparisons across 
countries and firms, can offer more insight than the repeated torture of the 
same domestic time-series aggregates, and such analysis does not depend on 
implausible assumptions of stationarity. The desirability of a greater emphasis 
on panel data to answer macroeconomic questions is further suggested by 
available empirical evidence that financing costs vary importantly across firms. 
As Schumpeter emphasized, business cycles are often driven by the activities of 
certain classes of firms and industries. The representative agent or firm ap- 
proach to understanding macroeconomics is liable to leave key actors out of the 
play. 
While financial factors can explain persistent reductions in the efficiency of 
capital allocations and economic activity, one must combine financial influences 
with other factors to explain protracted underutilization of resources (that is, 
unemployment and excess capacity). Here too recent research has shown the 
usefulness of abandoning the representative agent or firm assumption 
(Bernstein, 1987; Bresnahan and Raff, 1991, 1992; Margo, 1991, 1992; Wallis, 
1989). These authors have emphasized that the disruption of the early years of 
the Depression brought endogenous responses in technological choice, the 
composition of consumption demand, and demands for labor skills which had 
important effects on aggregate production, capacity utilization, and employ- 
ment. Like the new literature on financial factors, this body of research offers 
insights into how disturbances had long-lived effects on economic activity 
during the 1930s through their influences on the long-run survival of different 
firms and different technologies. For example, Bresnahan and Raff (1991, 
1992) argue that cyclical decline ("shake-out") hastened technological change 
in the automobile industry. Financial factors are unlikely to provide the entire 
explanation for how early adverse shocks were transformed into the Great 
Depression. 
A final lesson from the Depression for modern macroeconomics is the peril 
of assuming that shocks to technology (including changes in the cost of credit 
intermediation) are independent of shocks to monetary policy or other influ- 
ences on "aggregate demand." Some recent macroeconomic studies of the 
post-World War II period assume independence of aggregate demand and 
supply shocks, and assume that aggregate-demand shocks have transitory 
effects while aggregate-supply shocks have permanent effects. These identifying 
restrictions permit one to measure the relative importance of aggregate supply 
and demand shocks for causing variation in GNP (Blanchard and Quah, 1988; 
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Shapiro and Watson, 1988). This approach results in large measured contribu- 
tions to output variance at business cycle frequencies from supply shocks, which 
often are identified with exogenous technological change. 
But this separation of aggregate-supply and aggregate-demand innova- 
tions is hard to justify from the perspective of the history of the Great 
Depression. A common emphasis of recent research on the Depression, includ- 
ing but not limited to work on financial factors, is that disturbances to aggre- 
gate demand like money-supply shocks may have had persistent effects on 
output through endogenous changes in firms' and consumers' balance sheets, 
technological shake-out, and endogenous changes in demands for different 
types of labor and consumption goods.'2 In other words, monetary and other 
demand shocks had persistent effects on output, excess capacity, and unem- 
ployment through various channels connecting them to changes in the underly- 
ing structure of the economy. 
* The author is grateful to Michael Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, Michel Habib, Joseph 
Haubrich, Glenn Hubbard, Charles Kindleberger, Allan Meltzer, Frederic Mishkin, Jay 
Ritter, Hugh Rockoff, Joseph Stiglitz, Timothy Taylor, Peter Temin, David Wheelock, 
Eugene White, and Elmus Wicker for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
120f course, the notions that shocks to credit markets have a long-run impact on output, that 
technological change is endogenous to demand shocks, and that recessions are periods of realloca- 
tion of capital among firms that reflect heterogeneity with respect to technological opportunities 
and vulnerability to credit supply shocks are not new to macroeconomics. These were the basic 
building blocks of Schumpeter's (1939) theory of business cycles. 
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